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Article
Introduction: The Congress of 
Chambers of Commerce of the Empire
Chambers of commerce emerged across the English-speaking 
world through the late-18th and 19th centuries as voluntary 
organizations formed to bring together businessmen in par-
ticular localities (usually cities) to articulate common inter-
ests and provide services for members (Bennett, 2011). 
Increasingly they formed associations and congresses on a 
national and supranational basis (Ilersic, 1960). In June 
1886, the London Chamber of Commerce (a late-comer 
founded in 1882) announced that “the most important com-
mercial congress which has ever been held in any country” 
would take place that August in London to coincide with the 
Indian and Colonial Exhibition. The Congress of Chambers 
of Commerce of the Empire (CCCE) would bring together 
British chambers of commerce gathering at the exhibition for 
the annual meeting of the Association of Chambers of 
Commerce of the United Kingdom with chambers from the 
Empire. Following in the wake of J. R. Seeley’s (1883) 
Expansion of England and the foundation of the Imperial 
Federation League (Burgess, 1984), the London chamber’s 
journal explained that “federation in some shape, either com-
mercial or political, or a combination of the two, has been 
recognised by the London chamber as the great factor in the 
industrial future of the British Empire.”1 Some 90 chambers 
and more than 250 delegates attended the Congress. The 
majority (61%) came from Britain and a further 26% trav-
eled from the self-governing colonies (see Figure 1). The 
Congress met for 2 days under the chairmanship of the presi-
dent of the London Chamber of Commerce, J. Herbert 
Tritton, who welcomed his “kith and kin from the other side 
of the world” as “commercial interests afford us a common 
ground for discussion, and not for barren debate, but for the 
discussion which molds opinion and leads to important 
results.”2
The 1886 congress generated an organization which per-
sisted until the 1970s. The CCCE reconvened in 1892, 1896, 
and 1900, shifting location to the livery halls of the City of 
London. As Figure 1 shows, it remained dominated by 
Britain and the self-governing colonies (or dominions as 
they became known in 1907).3 The dependent empire was 
invariably “represented” by White expatriate interests. In 
1903, in a new departure, it met in Montreal, establishing a 
pattern of alternating between London and the dominions. 
The 1886 congress lasted 2 days; subsequent congresses 
lasted 4 or 5 days. From 1892, any chamber could propose 
resolutions and content for discussion and the outcome of 
votes on resolutions were determined on the floor of the 
Congress.4 Intensive rounds of banquets, receptions, and gar-
den parties accompanied congresses.5 Until 1911, a 
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committee (unoriginally titled the “Congress Organising 
Committee”) composed of leading figures of the London 
Chamber of Commerce, along with the colonial agents-gen-
eral and high commissioners, arranged the Congress. 
Thereafter, a new body took over: the British Imperial 
Council of Commerce, still housed in the London chamber’s 
offices.6 The Congress persisted through the interwar period 
into the era of decolonization. The last congress was held in 
1972, while the Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of 
Commerce, the successor of the British Imperial Council of 
Commerce, finally disbanded in 1975.7
By 1914, the CCCE had earned a high degree of recogni-
tion from leading figures of the day. The colonial secretary, 
Lord Knutsford, flattered the second Congress in 1892 that it 
was of “no less importance than the first Colonial Conference 
of 1887.”8 In 1910, the Birmingham historical economist, 
W. J. Ashley, described it as the “non-official commercial 
parliament of the empire” (1911, pp. xiv-xv). From 1892, 
eminent aristocrats, ministers, City-men, agents-general, and 
high commissioners lent their names to the proceedings as 
honorary vice-presidents. In 1896, colonial secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain opened the third CCCE as the first honorary 
president, a position British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith 
accepted in 1912.9 The Congress even enjoyed royal 
approval. The Prince of Wales granted the first Congress 
leave to convene in the Colonial and Indian Exhibition and 
attended the 1896 Congress’s banquet.10 In 1906, as Edward 
VII, he received a deputation of delegates. George V 
entertained 600 delegates and their ladies at Buckingham 
Palace in 1912.11 Thus, by the outbreak of the Great War, the 
CCCE had established itself as a leading unofficial institu-
tion of empire, one which was to persist through to the era of 
decolonization.
Despite its sheer scale, scope, status, and longevity, the 
existence of the Congress has barely registered in subse-
quent studies. It attracted only passing references in the 
work of W. G. Hynes, S. B. R. Smith, and Lance Davis and 
Ronald Huttenback on the economics of empire (Davis & 
Huttenback, 1987; Hynes, 1979; S. B. R. Smith, 1985).12 
The older literature on the evolution of the Commonwealth 
ignored it, favoring the study of evolving intergovernmental 
relations (Hancock, 1937, 1942; Mansergh, 1969; Miller, 
1974; McIntyre, 1977). Even W. D. McIntyre’s important 
but isolated work on the nongovernmental institutions of the 
Commonwealth makes no mention of the Congress (1991). 
Neither do the few published studies of chambers of com-
merce in Britain (Bennett, 2011; Ilersic, 1960). The Congress 
has attracted passing attention in Gary Magee and Andrew 
Thompson’s Empire and Globalisation and Andrew Dilley’s 
Finance, Politics, and Imperialism (Dilley, 2012; Magee & 
Thompson, 2010). Both focus on the economic effects of the 
networks and information flows generated by Congresses 
rather than the purpose of the CCCE itself.
This article presents the initial findings of the first research 
project to investigate the CCCE in its own right. It argues 
that it is necessary to take seriously the Congress’s self-pro-
fessed function, outlined by Tritton, as a forum for formulat-
ing and pursuing common positions on matters of political 
economy. It shows that the Congress sought to shape many 
aspects of economic governance affecting commerce, focus-
ing its attentions chiefly on either the British government, 
or—most frequently—the British and dominion govern-
ments together. This highlights the persistence of discernible 
patterns of economic governance integrating Britain and the 
dominions and concentrated in Britain, notwithstanding 
growing dominion autonomy following the concession of 
responsible government (internal self-government) to the 
main settler colonies in the mid-19th century.
The Historiographical Significance of 
the Congress
The CCCE’s focus on economic governance fits uneasily 
with the main paradigms through which Britain’s relations 
with the settlement empire have been understood by imperial 
historians since the Second World War. One line of argument 
follows Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher’s suggestion 
that after the concession of responsible government to the set-
tler colonies “it was possible to rely on economic dependence 
and mutual good feeling to keep the colonies bound to 
Britain.” (1953, p. 4) Robinson and Gallagher allowed little 
conceptual space for the imperial center in the settler colo-
nies. As Robinson put it, “the real motor of the [imperial] 
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Figure 1. A breakdown of participant chambers in the CCCE, 
1886-1914.
Source. Chambers of Commerce Journal Supplements, August 1886, p. 1, 
August 1892, pp. 1-2, August 1896, pp. 1-2; London Metropolitan Archive 
CLC/B/082/MS18287/1-2 (Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of 
Commerce Papers): Reports of Proceedings at Congresses, 1900-1909, 1911.
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process [lay] in the meshing of autonomous private enter-
prises with the internal politics of quasi-autonomous govern-
ments” (1986, p. 274, see also 1972, p. 124). This argument 
carried over into P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins’s treatment of 
Anglo-dominion relations within their broader revisionist 
study of British imperialism, which emphasized the “struc-
tural power” generated by the dominions’ dependence on 
London’s financial markets (1999, pp. 202-210; 2001, 
pp. 205-240). A business association geared to lobbying at a 
pan-imperial level, focusing its attentions on the British 
government, would seem an eccentric luxury in the world of 
the imperialism of free trade and structural power (though see 
Attard, 2013).
A second approach to Anglo-dominion relations has 
emerged in recent years under the banner of the “British 
world.” This literature also downplays the role of political 
institutions and argues that a broad set of social networks 
provided—to quote Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich—the 
“cultural glue” (shared identity) binding Britain and the 
dominions (and other pockets of Britishness) together 
(Bridge & Fedorowich, 2003b, p. 6, see also Bridge & 
Fedorowich, 2003a; Buckner & Francis, 2005; Darian-
Smith, Grimshaw, & Macintyre, 2007). Drawing on this 
sociocultural framework, Magee and Thompson’s (2010) 
recent study of the economics of the British world argues 
that “co-ethnic networks,” information flows, and shared 
identity created a “cultural economy” (at times including the 
United States), which formed a densely integrated segment 
of the world economy. Magee and Thompson downplay the 
role of institutions and the British state in shaping this cul-
tural economy. Thus, they conclude in their analysis of trade 
that “the empire was not an active ingredient in economic 
policy-making, but neither did the British state eschew any 
role whatsoever in promoting imperial trade” (pp. 11-14, 17, 
133). The Congress certainly fits the emerging picture of the 
unofficial transnational networks permeating the British 
world. However, a self-appointed parliament of commerce 
composed of businessmen formulating resolutions on pan-
imperial political economy and seeking to influence policy 
seems anomalous in the world of the cultural economy, 
where the British state and the empire were not “active 
ingredients.”
The anomaly is best resolved if a greater role is assigned 
to political economy and political institutions than the socio-
cultural conception at the core of the British World allows. 
An unofficial parliament may reflect the persistence of a pol-
ity, however difficult to pin down. Given the overwhelming 
importance of Britain and the self-governing colonies in the 
Congress, it may be more helpful to think of that polity not 
as the British empire in the round but rather as a “Third 
British Empire” (Darwin, 1999) or, with James Belich, to 
adopt the contemporary term Greater Britain. Belich writes 
of “Greater Britain” that “it was not just a failed idea. It had 
no formal shape, no federal constitution, yet it was an impor-
tant economic and cultural reality” (Belich, 2009, p. 460). 
Yet, perhaps Belich’s point can be pushed further. A grow-
ing body of scholarship has highlighted the political projects 
operating within Greater Britain (Bell, 2007; Palen, 2010; 
Potter, 2003, 2004, 2007; Thompson, 2000). Thus, notwith-
standing the failure of formalized schemes of imperial fed-
eration, it is becoming clear that Greater Britain possessed a 
political life beneath and beyond relations between its con-
stituent governments. This article builds on this emerging 
picture, stressing that Greater Britain not only possessed a 
high level of political activism, but also discernible practices 
of policy coordination and economic governance (see also 
A. Smith, 2013). These practices were shaped by responsible 
government and dominion aspirations for autonomy and, as 
a result, were complex, subtle, and involved coordination 
and cooperation between Britain and the dominions rather 
than British dominance. As we shall see, this “mezzanine 
federation” possessed a political as well as cultural and eco-
nomic reality for commercial elites.
To substantiate this case, the remainder of this article 
seeks to demonstrate that the CCCE can only be explained 
as an attempt to shape a discernible framework of economic 
governance within Greater Britain, and to a much lesser 
extent within the dependent empire. It draws on previously 
unused or underused archival materials, especially the pub-
lished accounts of the Congresses debates, the papers of the 
British Imperial Council of Commerce, and archival materi-
als from the London Chamber of Commerce, supplemented 
by the correspondence of participants, of other chambers, 
and the contemporary press.13 First, the article sketches the 
economic context within which the Congress emerged, 
showing how economic patterns provided chambers of com-
merce with powerful motives to cooperate. Second, it con-
siders the degree to which the Congress can be explained as 
a means of forming networks and for disseminating com-
mercial information: the processes at the heart of Magee and 
Thompson’s account of the cultural economy. The CCCE 
undoubtedly acted in both capacities, but there were other 
and better means to form networks and disseminate infor-
mation. The final section provides an overview of the 
Congress’s debates and lobbying activities, showing that its 
central purpose was to shape the framework of political 
economy within which commerce operated. Crucially, while 
contemporaries recognized the networking potential and 
cultural aspects of the Congress, they repeatedly empha-
sized its role as a vehicle to influence policy.
Trade in the Late-Victorian and 
Edwardian Greater Britain: Some 
Trends
The CCCE emerged against the backdrop of complex shifts 
in world trade in the late-19th and early-20th centuries (Saul, 
1960, pp. 43-63). Magee and Thompson have recently con-
firmed D. C. M. Platt’s observation that during this period, 
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British trade with imperial and particularly dominion mar-
kets proved more dynamic (i.e., grew faster) than trade with 
the foreign sector (Magee, 2007; Thompson & Magee, 2003, 
2010). Tables 1 and 2 summarize the key trends across the 
period 1886-1913 in the commerce of Britain, Australia, and 
Canada, the main players at the Congresses. The British data 
bear out Magee and Thompson’s arguments. The empire 
provided just under a quarter of British imports, and received 
about a third of British exports. The dominions accounted for 
a little more than half of all Britain’s imperial trade, an aver-
age of 11.35% of all imports, and 15.85% of all exports. 
Moreover, as Table 2 shows, the average annual growth of 
Table 1. Distributions of British, Australian, and Canadian Trade, 1886-1913 (Averages).
Britain Australiaa Canadab
 Imports (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) Exports (%)
Portion of trade with the foreign sectorc
 1886-1900 77.66 66.14 19.52 24.10 47.55 37.37
 1901-1913 76.78 64.49 39.90 41.51 60.18 40.28
 Average 1886-1913 77.22 65.32 29.33 32.48 53.87 38.83
Proportion of trade with the rest of the empired
 1886-1900 22.34 33.86 80.48 75.90 38.44 55.00
 1901-1913 23.22 35.51 60.10 58.49 28.23 56.72
 Average 1886-1913 22.78 34.68 70.67 67.52 33.33 55.86
Proportion of trade with Dominions/Britain
 1886-1900 10.70 15.60 68.74 68.63 36.52 51.01
 1901-1913 12.00 16.12 53.29 49.71 24.25 51.59
 Average 1886-1913 11.35 15.86 61.30 59.52 30.38 51.30
Source. Adapted from Schlote (1952, Tables 4-6, 20b); Vamplew (1987; Series 67-80, 152-166, pp. 189, 196); Leacy (1983; Series G381-388).
aAustralian data begins in 1887.
bCanadian data based on 5 yearly snapshots for 1886-1911.
cAustralian Data for New Zealand, Canada, and India only after 1901; includes Britain for Australia and Canada.
dUnited States Only for Canada.
Table 2. Annual Growth in British, Canadian, and Australian Trade, 1886-1914.
Britain Australiaa Canadab
 Imports (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) Exports (%) Imports (%) Exports (%)
Average annual growth in trade with the foreign sectorc
 1886-1900 2.47 2.78 9.90 13.68 2.48 1.18
 1901-1913 2.67 4.44 8.90 8.37 14.63 8.42
 Average 1886-1913 2.62 2.55 9.40 11.02 9.77 5.52
Average annual growth in trade with the empired
 1886-1900 1.51 1.55 2.27 3.78 −1.31 6.01
 1901-1913 4.75 5.96 3.40 3.49 11.18 6.36
 Average 1886-1913 3.21 2.43 2.84 3.64 6.19 6.22
Average annual growth in trade with Britain/Dominions
 1886-1900 3.02 2.41 2.23 3.26 −1.37 6.27
 1901-1913 4.26 5.63 3.93 4.35 10.01 5.87
 Average 1886-1913 3.79 3.20 3.08 3.81 5.46 6.03
Average annual growth in all trade
 1886-1900 2.25 2.27 3.69 5.83 1.04 3.77
 1901-1913 3.10 4.89 4.71 5.22 12.57 7.35
 Average 1886-1913 2.73 2.50 4.20 5.53 7.96 5.92
Source. Adapted from Schlote (1952, Tables 4-6, 20b); Vamplew (1987; Series 67-80, 152-166, pp. 189, 196); Leacy (1983; Series G381-388).
aAustralian data begins in 1887.
bCanadian data based on 5 yearly snapshots for 1886-1911.
cUnited States Only for Canada.
dAustralian Data for New Zealand, Canada, and India only after 1901; includes Britain for Australia and Canada.
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trade with the dominions exceeded the expansion of either 
foreign or empire trade across the whole period (although 
during the Edwardian period the growth of trade with the 
empire as a whole marginally outpaced the dominions alone). 
Overall, the dominions in particular, and the empire more 
generally, were becoming increasingly important markets 
for British traders.
Trends in Australian and Canadian trade did not exactly 
mirror those of the mother country. Although the empire 
became more significant for the British, the foreign sector 
played an increasingly important role in Australian and 
Canadian trade. However, the overall portions of trade with 
Britain were far greater in the Canadian and Australian cases. 
Throughout the period, the empire as a whole took an abso-
lute majority of Australian imports and exports. The propor-
tions declined markedly in the Edwardian period, and Britain 
alone ceased to take an absolute majority of Australia’s 
exports. The growth of Australia’s trade with the foreign sec-
tor outpaced its imperial and British trading connections. 
This reflects a diversification of the Australian economy in 
the wake of the 1890s depression and the acquisition of new 
markets for Australian wool in continental Europe (Meredith 
& Dyster, 1999, pp. 59-69).
The proportions of Canadian exports to the empire held 
firm at just more than half across the period, while the pro-
portion of Canadian imports from the empire (chiefly from 
Britain) declined. However, the Canadian experience was 
very different before and after 1896. In the 1880s and the 
early-1890s the Canadian economy grew slowly (Urquhart, 
1992). British markets provided the most rapidly growing 
market for Canadian exports and absorbed an average of 
38% of imports. From 1896, Canada experienced an explo-
sive boom driven by inward investment, transcontinental 
railway construction, industrialization, population expan-
sion, the settlement of the prairies, and the exploitation of 
other raw materials (Bothwell, Drummond, & English, 1987, 
pp. 55-83). As a result, the overall volume of Canadian trade 
grew dramatically (from 1901-1913 at an average annual rate 
of 12.57% for imports and 7.35% for exports). Booming 
Canada’s imports and exports grew so dramatically, and 
diversified sufficiently, that even a colossal average annual 
expansion of 10% of imports from and 5.87% of exports to 
Britain (and slightly higher figures for the empire as a whole) 
failed to keep pace with the overall trend. This should not 
mask the continued importance of imperial trade, particu-
larly with Britain. Even after 1896, Britain remained a major 
and expanding market.
Imperial markets were not the fastest growing for either 
Australia or Canada, but the overall volume of trade made 
them a significant proportion of the whole. Moreover, 
Australian and (in the Edwardian period particularly) Canadian 
governments and businessmen sought not only to generate 
trade but also to attract inward investment and migrants, and 
the primary source of men and money remained in Britain 
(Dilley, 2012, pp. 2-3). These commercial and investment 
dynamics within the empire provided incentives for business-
men to seek to form networks or to shape the regulatory 
framework governing sizable or dynamic intraimperial 
economic transactions. Which of these two possibilities—
political economy or cultural economy—dominated and drove 
the CCCE?
Cultural Economy and the Congress: A 
Crucible for “Co-Ethnic Networks”?
To show that a desire to shape the framework of political 
economy within which commercial activity in the empire 
(particularly in Greater Britain) took place, it is helpful to 
first examine the degree to which Magee and Thompson’s 
concept of cultural economy can explain the activities of the 
Congress. Magee and Thompson argue that what they call 
“co-ethnic networks” facilitated the development of eco-
nomic connections in the British World, and have argued 
that the Congress contributed to this process (Magee & 
Thompson, 2010, p. 147; see also Dilley, 2012, pp. 99-101). 
What role did the goal of forging networks and sharing infor-
mation play in the operation of the congress, and how central 
were these activities to its success?
Certainly, networking formed one element of the pro-
fessed purpose of the CCCE. The Chamber of Commerce 
Journal wrote approvingly that the Congress would “afford 
opportunities to those engaged in commerce to become per-
sonally acquainted with the internal resources of the empire 
and with each other, thus tending to strengthen the bonds of 
unity.”14 It is likely that individual networks were formed 
during Congresses, although beyond assertions to that effect 
by the Chamber of Commerce Journal this is difficult to 
verify.15 Nonetheless, there were other (and indeed more 
efficient) means of making individual contacts than sitting 
listening in silence for 4 days to formal debates. Indeed, a 
skeptical Western Australian agent-general, Walter James, 
judged the 1906 CCCE “too large in numbers for delegates 
to become personally acquainted.”16
The Congress may have been more effective as a means to 
advertise whole regions. From 1903, the Congress began 
alternating between London and an overseas dominion. 
Although this development ran with the grain of dominion 
aspirations to express autonomy within the empire (Eddy & 
Schreuder, 1988; Jebb, 1905), it reflected the desire to adver-
tise the trade and investment opportunities that each domin-
ion offered—to exploit the networking and advertising 
potential of the concentration of a large number of business-
men representing the commercial cities of the empire in one 
place. This aspiration clearly underlay Montreal’s invitation 
of the Congress to Canada in 1903 (see Figure 2). The shift 
was initiated by the Montreal Board of Trade with the sup-
port of a grant from the Canadian government.17 As the 
Canadian finance minister, W. S. Fielding, observed, “the 
occasion is an important one and we ought to do the thing 
decently.”18 Great efforts were made to present the delegates 
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with a positive and comprehensive overview of Canadian 
resources. They enjoyed free rail and steamship passage 
across the dominion, joined organized tours of the Maritimes 
and the West, and received complementary copies of the 
Handbook of Canada and Statistical Yearbook of the 
Dominion. The Montreal Board of Trade also produced lan-
tern slides for the London Chamber of Commerce to distrib-
ute in Britain.19
Other dominions followed the Canadian lead and recog-
nized the advertising potential of the CCCE. At the 1906 
Congress, the Cape Town and Melbourne chambers com-
peted to host the next meeting. The Australians triumphed not 
least because Canadian delegates supported their bid, calcu-
lating that large numbers of British delegates would travel 
across Canada en route.20 The president of the Melbourne 
Chamber of Commerce predicted that the Congress (which 
was later moved from Melbourne to Sydney) would be a 
“splendid advertisement for Australia,” which then had a gen-
erally poor image in British financial and commercial cir-
cles.21 Discounted travel and elaborate tours were again laid 
on for delegates.22 The vice-president of the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce of the Commonwealth of Australia 
judged that the delegates had returned home “deeply 
impressed with the unbounded possibilities of this vast conti-
nent.” He predicted that they would become “advertising 
agent[s]” disseminating “very satisfactory information . . . 
with regard to the position of Australia.”23 Certainly, Australia 
won a powerful friend in Albert Spicer, president of the 
Congress and of the London Chamber of Commerce, who 
spoke on Australia’s economic potential in London and 
Birmingham and also wrote on its resources (Spicer, 1911).24
Commercial networking was clearly an element sustain-
ing the Congress, and promoting particular regions more 
generally, provided one motive for dominion participation 
when the Congress traveled abroad. Yet most Congresses 
were held in London, and the use of overseas Congresses to 
advertise the dominions developed later and as an (not unim-
portant) adjunct to the CCCE’s core activities. Moreover, as 
Magee and Thompson have charted so comprehensively, 
other means existed to promote networking and information 
flows, ranging from informal kinship ties and professional 
networks through to formalized tours and exhibitions (Magee 
& Thompson, 2010). The first Congress was held in 1886 to 
coincide with the Colonial and Indian Exhibition precisely 
because businessmen from across the empire would already 
be present and mingling with British businessmen in the con-
text of the exhibition. Networking and information flows are 
not sufficient to explain the establishment and persistence of 
the Congress. They were (possibly significant) by-products 
of its activities.
Commerce, Political Economy, and 
Greater Britain
The considerable time and expense that the Congresses 
involved suggest that we should take its discussions of pan-
imperial (and especially Greater British) political economy 
seriously. As one Torontonian delegate put it during a heated 
debate on tariffs, “We do not come across the Atlantic to 
spend large sums of money and time on purpose to attend 
these meetings without being in earnest with regard to these 
matters.”25 Individual chambers devoted considerable energy 
to formulating their positions on Congress resolutions. The 
London chamber debated its stance extensively in its govern-
ing council and press reportage on the Southampton and 
Birmingham chambers, and the Canadian Boards of Trade, 
in the 1890s, suggest that it was by no means uniquely dili-
gent.26 Canadians were particularly active within the 
Congress. Indeed, in 1906, Walter James complained that the 
“great bulk of work was brought forward by Canada,” that 
Canadians delivered long prepared speeches in the course of 
debate, and jibed that this “Niagara-like flow of Canadian 
eloquence . . . was a striking testimony to the extent to which 
these good people had been Americanised.” 27 However 
tedious the result may at times have been, delegates came not 
only to mingle but to persuade.
What commercial topics made sense to discuss in an 
imperial context? It is not possible to reproduce in detail the 
debates of the eight Congresses held before the First World 
War. However Figure 3 provides a digest of the time devoted 
to various topics of debate. Broadly, proceedings focused 
either on micro-level matters specific to commerce (regula-
tion, lighthouse charges, commercial education, the metric 
system, the codification of commercial law) or macro-level 
principles of imperial political economy (imperial prefer-
ence, defense, political integration). The significance of 
micro-level regulation should not be underestimated, a point 
made by Magee and Thompson (2010, p. 147). For example, 
at the 1886 congress a good deal of discussion was devoted 
to Bills of Lading—the contracts between merchants and 
Figure 2. The Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the 
Empire, Montreal 1903.
Source. Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs for 1903 (Toronto, The 
Annual Review Publishing Company, 1904), p. 319 (out of copyright).
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shippers for the carriage of merchandise. The issue turned on 
who carried the risk of damage to goods, particularly at the 
point of loading or unloading, and the congress resolved 
(after some protest by shipping interests) to seek more gener-
ous terms for merchants.28 This was the kind of legislation 
which self-governing colonies often copied verbatim from 
the imperial government (Girard, 2008; A. Smith, 2013). A 
common position combined with effective lobbying had 
clear utility in this context.
The Congress also sought such common positions on 
broader macro-level pan-imperial political economy. These 
were subjects on which effective action required cooperation 
between the various constituent governments of Greater 
Britain. Agreement was rather more elusive, except through 
painstakingly constructed compromise positions. As a result, 
as Figure 3 shows, defense, imperial political integration, 
communications, and the promotion of emigration all 
attracted consistent attention and time in Congress. This was 
particularly true of the most controversial topic of all: pro-
posals to promote imperial integration through schemes of 
mutually advantageous trading arrangements (imperial pref-
erence). Tariff policy occupied the largest proportion of pro-
ceedings, peaking at more than 50% in 1892, and averaging 
at least 30% from 1886 to 1914. This reflects the issue’s 
importance and the difficulties of reconciling different parts 
of the empire to varying schemes of preferential trade in the 
context of the British government’s adherence to free trade 
and dominion protectionism (Cain, 1979; Howe, 1997; 
Thompson, 1997).
The Congresses constituted one of the most public pan-
imperial arenas within which the debate over imperial pref-
erence was conducted. Canadians were prominent advocates 
of various forms of imperial preference. In 1886 the London 
Chamber attempted to avoid discussion of tariff policy, but 
the issue was raised by the Canadian high commissioner, 
Charles Tupper, and his predecessor Alexander Galt.29 
Canadian boards of trade remained prominent advocates 
of various forms of imperial preference in subsequent 
Congresses.30 This Canadian activism reflected fears of 
political absorption and a sense of economic vulnerability 
aroused by the U.S. McKinley Tariff of 1890 (Palen, 2010).31 
It also reflected the way in which particular chambers or 
groups of chambers could use the Congress as a means to 
garner support for their own agendas. Excepting the Canadian 
phalanx, debates on imperial commercial relations rarely 
broke down purely on “national lines.” Thus, at early 
Congresses Sydney and Cape Town advocated free trade, 
while from 1903 increasing numbers of British chambers 
favored imperial preference (including London from 1909).32 
The balance of opinion in Congress (as expressed in its reso-
lutions) shifted away from free trade through the 1890s and 
1900s. In 1892, the Congress called for the abrogation of 
treaties obstructing imperial commercial integration on the 
“freest possible basis.”33 Joseph Chamberlain used the 1896 
Congress to float the idea of an imperial zollverein (free 
trade area). This met considerable opposition and the 1896 
and 1900 Congresses, respectively, called for an imperial 
conference and Royal Commission to consider imperial 
commercial relations.34 The 1903 Montreal Congress called 
for a commercial policy based on “the principles of mutual 
benefit.”35 In 1906, the Congress passed a resolution calling 
for preferential treatment by a vote of 105 to 41, with 
22 chambers abstaining.36 In 1909, the Congress passed a 
resolution for “preferential treatment on a reciprocal basis” 
by 65 to 9 against (led by Manchester) and 17 abstaining 
(including Melbourne and Sydney).37
Congresses aspired to exert influence on the micro- and 
macro-level issues that they discussed. The Congress was 
justified through its supposed impact. Thus in Sydney in 
1909 the president of the Congress, Albert Spicer (who was 
also president of the London chamber), asserted that previ-
ous Congresses had “done something in molding opinion, 
spurring on administrative action, and stimulating legisla-
tion, thus leaving our impress upon the policies of both 
Home and Dominion governments.” He listed three pages of 
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Figure 3. The subjects of debates at the congresses of chambers 
of commerce of the empire, 1886-1912.
Source. Chambers of Commerce Journal Supplements, Aug 1886, p. 1, Aug 
1892, p. 1-2, Aug. 1896, p. 1-2; London Metropolitan Archive CLC/B/082/
MS18287/1-2 (Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce 
Papers): Reports of Proceedings at Congresses, 1900-1909, 1911.
Note. The figures are based on measurements of the space (by quarter 
pages) taken up in the verbatim minutes on various resolutions which 
have been classified under the headings used in the chart. The numbers in 
brackets indicate the proportion of all discussion taken up by each subject 
during the period.
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supposed achievements across a range of fields, including: 
the development of colonial conferences and imperial inte-
gration; imperial defense (which was “rising in profile”); tar-
iff reform (where the Congress had thrown “fresh light” on 
the subject); commercial law (where British legislation on a 
range of issues had been “digested by India and the colo-
nies”); imperial transport and communications (for instance, 
the 1898 Imperial Penny post or rail construction in India 
and West Africa); international arbitration; voluntary arbitra-
tion and conciliation in industrial disputes; and commercial 
education. Given this record, Spicer expressed confidence in 
the CCCE’s future ability to “mould opinion” and “lay the 
basis of future legislation,” not least because “Chambers of 
Commerce are being increasingly looked to by our various 
governments for information and counsel on commercial 
matters.”38 While such self-justifying cant should be treated 
with caution, it reveals the degree to which the CCCE aspired 
to shape policy through collective action.
Aspiration generated action. From the outset attempts 
were made to give effect to Congress resolutions, and these 
attempts grew more, not less, systematized with time. From 
1886 onwards, the Congress authorized the Congress 
Organising Committee to pursue its meticulously recorded 
resolutions. Three of the first Congress’s seven resolutions 
called for further action (on imperial federation, the codifica-
tion of commercial law, and bills of lading).39 The 
Committee’s minutes have not survived, and its activities 
can only be partly reconstructed. For example, in 1892, the 
Marques of Ripon received a deputation from the Congress 
Organising Committee seeking to extend merchandise legis-
lation across the empire. In the same year, a member of the 
London chamber (S. B. Boulton) invoked a Congress resolu-
tion when arguing for voluntary arbitration in labour disputes 
before a Royal Commission on labour disputes.40 By the turn 
of the 20th century, there was a growing concern to pursue 
CCCE resolutions more effectively. In 1900, a member of 
the London chamber’s Council suggested an “abiding 
bureau” to continue the work between Congresses. As a 
result, the Congress Organising Committee became perma-
nent, reporting to the London chamber regarding progress on 
Congress resolutions.41 By 1909, leading lights at the London 
chamber had concluded that a more systematic approach was 
required. In that year, Alfred Spicer persuaded the Sydney 
congress to allow the establishment of a permanent organiza-
tion so that “the work would continue without intermission 
from one congress to another” and resolutions would be 
“sent to the different governing departments with 
persistency.”42
As a result, the British Imperial Council of Commerce 
was established in 1911. It reflected the aspirations to exert 
political influence which underpinned the Congress. The old 
Congress Organising Committee, with the addition of per-
manent members from the dominions, formed the nucleus of 
the new association which remained housed in the London 
chamber’s offices. The Council’s governing committee took 
the dissemination of the 1912 Congress’s 41 resolutions seri-
ously, considering each in turn. It decided to take specific 
action on 28 resolutions, judging that the circulation of the 
Congress proceedings would be sufficient in six further 
cases, and noting that the Council had already acted on four 
further matters. This left just two resolutions on which no 
measures of any kind were considered appropriate.43 Table 3 
analyses their initial mailings on the basis of Congress reso-
lutions, indicating the peculiar contours of economic gover-
nance in Greater Britain. Of the 28 resolutions on which 
specific action was taken, 82.1% were sent to the British 
government, 67.9% to various “self-governing colonies” (as 
they were described), while only 7 were sent to India, 3 to the 
West Indies, and 2 to the dependent empire. 68% of resolu-
tions acted on involved lobbying more than one govern-
ment—with the U.K. and dominion governments the most 
common recipients of joint resolutions. Only two resolutions 
Table 3. Correspondence on the Basis of 1912 CCCE’s Resolutions Undertaken by the British Imperial Council of Commerce.
Government lobbied Number of resolutions
Percentage of the 28 resolutions on 
which specific action was taken (%)
Percentage of all 41 congress 
resolutions (%)
United Kingdom 23 82.1 62.2
United Kingdom + at least some 
Dominions
17 60.7 45.9
United Kingdom Alone 6 21.4 16.2
Dominions 19 67.9 51.4
Dominions excluding United Kingdom 2 7.1 5.4
India 7 25.0 18.9
West Indies 3 10.7 8.1
Other dependent empire 2 7.1 5.4
Resolutions on which specific action 
was taken
28 100.0 75.7
Source. LMA: CLC/B/082/MS18283 (Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce Papers): Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of the British 
Imperial Council of Commerce, 16 July 1912, Minute Book, 1911-1926, p. 32-35; Reports of Congress, 1912, p. 2 and passim.
Note. CCCE = the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire; LMA = London metropolitan archive.
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were sent only to dominion governments. The centrality of 
the British government discounts any possibility that this 
was an organization geared toward exerting informal influ-
ence over the dominions while highlighting the continuing 
importance of the metropole in economic governance. 
However, this pattern indicates again the overwhelming 
dominance of Greater Britain in the congresses’ activities, as 
well as the convoluted nature of lobbying in that mezzanine 
federation.
Given this, it may come as no surprise that the Congress 
consistently favoured a more integrated and rationalized gov-
erning structure for the empire (while remaining studiously 
vague on the problematic details). This began in 1886 with a 
call that “members of Her Majesty’s Government . . . for the 
purpose of requesting that the colonial governments be at 
once consulted by the home government as to the best means 
of carrying out some efficient scheme of imperial federa-
tion.”44 A year later, the first Colonial Conference (a meeting 
of the British government and the premiers of the self-gov-
erning colonies) took place (Kendle, 1967). Those involved 
in the Congress often discerned connections between their 
activities and the growing level of consultation within the 
Empire. In May 1895, the Chamber of Commerce Journal 
claimed that the unofficial intergovernmental conference in 
Ottawa in 1893 was “stimulated by the spirit of the London 
Congress of 1892” and noted the “close resemblances of the 
proceedings.” Moreover, one delegate in Ottawa (James 
Hoddart) had told the conference that his projects for improv-
ing communication between Canada, Australia, and England 
had been the result of “the impressions made upon him by the 
London meeting.”45 When opening the Montreal CCCE in 
1903, Lord Strathcona (Canadian High Commissioner) 
asserted that the 1900 Congress carried “no little weight” in 
causing the 1902 Colonial Conference.46 Such claims should 
not be entirely discounted. The CCCE was the closest unof-
ficial equivalent of the conferences and anticipated by several 
years their development into a formal and regular consulta-
tive mechanism between the governments of Britain and the 
empire. It made sense for a pan-imperial business association 
to seek to strengthen the central institutions of the empire 
which it sought to lobby, albeit in ways compatible with 
responsible government and dominion autonomy.
Conclusion
The CCCE aspired to (and believed it could) shape the 
framework of imperial (particularly Greater British) political 
economy. Growing British trade with the dominions and the 
large proportions of dominion trade conducted with Britain 
provided commercial elites with powerful incentives to seek 
to shape the framework of political economy within which 
they operated. Networking and the promotion of information 
flows—the processes at the heart of Magee and Thompson’s 
model of the cultural economy—certainly took place within 
the congress, but they were not in the end its raison d’être. 
The time and effort devoted to the debates themselves and 
the increasing concern to articulate the emergent views to a 
host of governments in themselves reflect the existence of a 
pan-imperial framework of economic governance, falling 
within the remit of multiple governments. Within this mez-
zanine federation it made sense for chambers of commerce to 
cooperate where they could establish common interests on 
matters ranging from fine-grained regulatory detail through 
to the macro-level concerns. The extent to which the 
Congress succeeded in shaping policy requires further 
research. Participants certainly believed that their delibera-
tions had an impact. However, the argument made here is not 
dependent on the Congress having had a discernible impact 
on policy. Rather the point is that there was a discernible 
policy framework (and hence polity) which could (poten-
tially) be influenced through collective action.
The Congress’s focus on shaping pan-imperial political 
economy fits uneasily with the paradigms which have domi-
nated historical understanding of relations between the set-
tler colonies and Britain. An organization focused on 
lobbying the imperial centre or the centre in conjunction with 
dominion governments cannot be understood as a means to 
exert British informal influence in the dominions. It was not 
a vehicle for Robinsonian “collaboration” or “structural 
power.” The Congress could be seen as another pan-British 
world network or (more accurately) an association joining 
the ranks of journalists, female imperialists, academics, and 
even feminists and labor activists who pervade the literature 
(Kirk, 2011; Pickles, 2002; Pietsch, 2010; Potter, 2003; 
Woollacott, 2001). Yet, to consider this another British 
world network would be to confuse the means with the ends. 
The CCCE highlights the existence of broader political 
framework which can be glimpsed but is as yet insufficiently 
acknowledged in the conceptualization of the British world 
around social networks and shared identity. Yet notwith-
standing responsible government and the failure of more for-
malized schemes of imperial federation, discernible practices 
of policy formulation and coordination encompassed Britain 
and the dominions (the “Third British Empire,” “Greater 
Britain,” and later the “old” Commonwealth). This polity 
and its practices of governance framed a broader political life 
that stretched beneath and beyond the formal intergovern-
mental relations and negotiations. Within this broader politi-
cal life, the politics of commerce embodied in the CCCE 
played an important and hitherto neglected role.
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